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In the SupreDie Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
LYXX JOHNSTUN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
Case No. 
vs. 
7174 
J. H. HARRISON, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT J. H. HARRISON 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 4th, 1947, there was an election held 
for the election of City Councilmen in the City of Roose-
velt, Duchesne County, State of Utah. At such election, 
defendant and appellant, J. H. Harrison, and plaintiff 
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and Respondent, Lynn Johnstun, each were candidates 
for election to the office of City Councilman. 
There were two political parties, one known as the 
Peoples Party and one known as the Progressive Party. 
There were three councilmen to be chosen for the city. 
The name of plaintiff, Lynn Johnstun, appeared 
under the Peoples Party Emblem and the name of de-
fendant, J. H. Harrison, appeared under the emblem of 
the Progressive Party. Thus, there were three council-
men on each party ticket. 
At said election, the plaintiff, Lynn J ohnstun, re-
ceived 205 votes and the defendant, J. H. Harrison, re-
ceived 207 votes. Defendant Harrison was then issued a 
certificate of election. The plaintiff initiated this con-
test, and the statement of contest, so far as material here, 
alleges as follows : 
'' 7. That in counting the ballots in eaeh of 
the said election districts the election judges did 
in a great number of instances fail to count for 
plaintiff ballots in which persons had marked their 
x in the square opposite the name of the plaintiff 
when no line was drawn through the name of thr 
person on the opposite ticket. That in 1nany in-
stances voters would vote the emblem in and for 
the Progressive Ticket, and then the same voters 
made an x in the square opposite the name of 
plaintiff, and in counting such ballots, the judgef' 
would and did refuse to count such votes for plain-
tiff. 
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"~. That ~PVPrnl ballot:.-, the ex ad numhPr of 
which are unkno\\·n to plaintiff, were marked in 
the part~· e1nblem cirele of the Progressive Part~·, 
and tlw voter would Inark an x in the square op-
po:'itP one of the three candidates for 2 year City 
Councilman whose nmne appeared under the 
Peoples party column, but nothing appeared on 
such ballots to di~rlo8e \vhich of the three candi-
dates for ~ year city councihnan on the Progres-
~ive Ticket the voter intended eliminate by hav-
ing voted for three thereunder and one on the 
Peoples party, and under such ballots the judges 
of election did eliminate the vote for the person 
voted for individually on the Peoples party ticket, 
and the nan1e opposite the name of such candidate 
a~ it appeared on the Progressive Partys ticket. 
That by such erroneous counting of such ballots 
for defendant, he received and was given more 
than hvo votes which he was not entitled to have 
had counted for him, that were in fact counted for 
him." (Record 88) 
Defendant Harrison duly demurred to the Statement 
of ('on test in the following language: 
"That ~aid Ntatement of Contest· and Com-
plaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute 
a ran~e of action for an election contest agains1 
this Defendant and Contestee. 
"Defendant and contestee demurs specially 
on the ground that the plaintiff and contestant 
has not c-omplied with Section 2;)-14-4 Revised 
Statute:-; of Utah 1943 in that the correct name of 
either plaintiff and contestant or defendant and 
ContPstee is not shown; in that said statement of 
· eontf·st and complaint does not show what election 
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district of the CitY of Roosevelt of which the 
plaintiff and cont~stant is a resident; that the 
grounds of contest are ambiguous, unintelligible 
and uncertain and do not state a cause of action 
against this defendant and contestee. 
''And in particular that the allegations of said 
statement of contest and complaint do not allege 
facts sufficient to overcome· the presumption of 
legality of the certificate of election duly issued to 
the defendant and contestee as shown by the said 
complaint.'' (Record 90) 
This demurrer was overruled by the Court. (Record 
This case was tried by the court on the 23rd day of 
February 1948'' (this is error as the case was tried be-
fore the court on January 23, 1948). The court made 
findings on the evidence on the purported issues. (See 
Record 97 to 100) 
The court then concludes from the Findings that 
the plaintiff, Lynn J ohnstun, was elected to the office 
of two-year city councilman of the eit~· of Roosevelt, and 
decree was entered accordingly, declaring the election 
of the plaintiff, Lynn .Johnstun. (Record 98) 
That in counting the votes before the court there 
were 69 ballots which were rejected by court and coun-
sel as not being voted for either plaintiff or defendant. 
There were five ballots marked Exhibits which appear 
in the record, two of whieh were counted by the court for 
plaintiff and three for the defendant. (Rec. 75-77) 
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rrhat not one of the 69 and not one of said five votes 
were voted in the manner set forth in either or all of the 
plaintiff's statement of contest. 
In other words, there was no evidence whatever to 
support any of the allegations of the plaintiff's com-
plaint or statement of contest. 
There was voted and counted for the contestant two 
Ballots, Exhibits 2 and 3, wherein two voters voted by 
check mark Yery similar in design, from which the judges 
of election, who may have had some inf()rmation upon 
the subject, might readily agree that the two votes so 
cast and so similar were voted as a means of identifica-
tion. (Rec. 71 and 72) 
That the court allowed costs to the contestant in the 
sum of $64.80. (Rec. 103) 
One ballot was cast at the election for the contestee 
J. H. Harrison. The stub was not detached from the bal-
lot, but placed in the ballot box with other ballots. The 
court rejected this vote for the contestee. (Rec. 73) 
In the trial of said cause it was stipulated that not 
one ballot was found in the 69 votes which was rejected 
by court and counsel wherein the voter had voted the 
emblem on the progressive ticket and one on the peoples 
ticket, or for the contestant on the peoples ticket. 
It was further stipulated that there was no evidence 
which justified the opening of the ballots. The record on 
thiH stipulation as to district No. 1 is as follows: (Rec. 
68) 
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"MR. PATTERSON: Just a 1ninute. I would 
like to make a record in relation to this. I would 
like to call the court's attention to the fact that 
in our counting of the ballots there is no instances 
where the circle was voted and four votes cast. 
THE COURT: Do you· want to make any-
thing for the record on that, 1\fr. Dillman~ 
MR. DILLMAN: No. 
THE COURT: All right, the record may so 
show.'' 
At the end of the count, (Rec. 75) the following 
appears as to Districts Nos. 1 and 2: 
":Mr. PATTERSON: _May I make a record 
at this time with reference to the votes which were 
cast for neither, which have been rejected by this 
court. That no vote was voted where the emblem 
was voted and where one vote was cast upon the 
other side, thus constituting voting for four. There 
is only one instance in the votes rejected, that i:::, 
in the no-count votes, ·where four was voted, and 
in that instance the!· voted in the square of the 
Progressive ticket and voted for Lawrence Pack 
under the People's ticket with a cross, voting for 
four. I call the ronrt 's attention to that. 
Then let me add on to that also, Your Honor, 
that there is no evidence in the record whatrvPr 
to show the situation where two ballots were cast 
under the progressive ticket and one ballot w:1s 
cast under the 'People's tirket. In othrr words, 
that the ballots clearly disclos<~ that thPrP is no 
evidence for the o1~der opening the ballots. 
THE COURT: What do you want to <lo 
about it, ~fr. Patterson~ 
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:JLR. J>ATTERSOX: 'rell, I 1night as well. 
Your Honor, ask the court to set aside the count. 
THE COURT: "'"ell, do you want to do it¥ 
Are you n1aking a formal motion"? Your drawing 
the attention of the court to it doesn't mean a 
thing, either here or in the Supreme Court. If you 
want the court to do anything about it, make ~'our 
record, and then we will rule upon it; then we will 
haYe it here and also in the Supreme Court. 
:JIR. PATTERSON: By reason of the fact 
that the counted Ballots, and especially those bal-
lots which have been rejected as to both sides, 
clearly show that there is no evidence in support 
of the proposition to open the ballots, we now 
move that the count be set aside and that the de-
fendant herein be declared the duly elected, quali-
fied and acting councilman of the City of Roose-
velt. 
THE COURT: Do you resist that, l\f r. Dill-
manf 
:JfR. DILL:JIAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Here is the court's view on 
that matter, and the record may show it. The 
evidence respecting errors or unlawful votes is 
required. The plaintiff has the burden of proving 
that there were errors or there were unlawful 
\'otes received, or that there were lawful votes 
rejected, and sufficient to change the result of the 
election if the errors had not been made. The 
plaintiff is required to prove that by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. And that is a preliminary re-
quirement to the opening of the ballots. r~rhe mat-
ter is thus res adjudicata upon the determination 
of the court on the opening of the ballots, and the 
hallots themselves are not competent evidence to 
establish the preliminary requirements for the 
opening of ballots. 
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'rhe eourt is eonscious that such may admit 
of perjured testimony. In the event that any wit-
ness has wilfully testified falsely he is responsible 
under the criminal laws. And if there has been 
perjured testiinony, then proper proceedings 
should be had to hold the perjurer responsible 
under the criminalla ws. 
But as far as the contest itself is concerned, 
the evidence did, hy a preponderance of the evi-
denc·e, not only justify but required the order of 
opening. The opening has been made, the ballots 
have been counted, and if there has been a dif-
ferent situation shown on the count of the bal-
lots, it cannot affect the order for opening or the 
determination of the grounds for the opening. 
'Thus that becomes res adjudicata in the case. 
Therefore, the motion will be denied. 
:MR. PATTERSON: Exception." (Rec. 76) 
Tme rule that the ballots are the besrt .evidence of 
how the one voted, must apvply alS'o to the proposition a.8 
to whether they we.re vorterl in tilt'::': nw1wner alle!Jed iu 
plaintiff's complaint. 
STATJ1~~1ENT OF ERROR 
THE COURT ERRED AS FOLLO\Vf-i: 
1. In overruling the defendant's demurrer to the 
plaintiff's complaint. (Rec. R3) 
2. In opening the ballot pouches, there being no 
pleading or evidence to justify the same. 
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:~. In it~ Findings of Fad as ~et forth in our state-
ment of the Case, upon which its conclusions and decree 
were entered. (Rec. R. 97) 
-t In its conclusions of law. 
5. In its Decree. The same not being supported by 
any evidence or by any finding. 
6. In decreeing that the contestant Lynn J ohnstun 
was elected to the office of the two-year City Council-
man of the City of Roosevelt, Utah, at the election held 
in Roosevelt on the -1th day of November, 1947. 
7. That the evidence is insufficient as a matter of 
law to justify the findings of the court, the conclusions 
and the decree entered pursuant thereto. 
8. The plaintiff, by his pleadings, did not conform 
to 25-14-4 UCA 1943 in that he did not identify himself 
as the plaintiff and the defendant as J. H. Harrison as 
required by subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of 25-14-4 UCA 1943. 
(See Complaint Rec. P. 83) 
9. That there was voted and counted for the con-
te~tant two ballot~, Exhibit 2 and 3, wherein two voted 
hy check mark very similar in design from which the 
judges of election, who may have had some information 
upon the subject, might readily agree that the two votes 
so cast and so sirnilar were voted as a mea.ns of identi-
fication. (Rec. 71 and 72) 
10. rl'hat the court allowed costs to the contestant 
in tlw ~um of $G4.80. (Rec. 103) 
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11. That the court refused to count for the defend-
ant one ballot found in tl1e ballot box and voted for the 
defendant, to which the stub of the ballot was attached. 
ARGUMENT 
The complaint presents three proposals for alleged 
erroneous counting of ballots: 
PROPOSAL NO.1: 
"7. That in counting the ballots in each of 
the said election districts the election judges did 
in a great number of instances fail to count for 
plaintiff ballots in which persons had marked 
their x in the square opposite the name of the 
plaintiff when no line was drawn through the 
name of the person on the opposite ticket. * * * 
PROPOSAL NO.2: 
''That in many instances voters would vote 
the emblem in and for the Progressive Ticket, and 
then the same voters make an x in the square op-
posite the name of plaintiff, and in counting sneh 
ballots, the judges would and did refuse to count 
such votes for plaintiff.'' 
PROPOSAL NO.3: 
(See Paragraph 8 of the complaint as set out 
on page 84 Rec.) 
Point No. 1, to-wit, "The court erred in overruling 
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defendant's detnurrer to the plaintiff's complaint" (Rec. 
3): 
To facilitate the argument on this point, we produce 
a sample ballot used at the election insofar as it relates 
to the three councilmen voted for: 
PEOPLE'S PARTY PROGRESSIVE PARTY 
0 0 
For councilman-2-year For councilman-2-year 
LYXN JOHNSTUN lXI ELMER ELDREDGE D 
For councilman-2-year For councilman-2-year 
LAWRENCE PACK 0 J. H. HARRrSON D 
For councilman-2-year For councilman-2-year 
SAM 0. WEISS 0 NORMAN MURPHY 0 
On proposal No. 1 it is observed that the contestant 
~ays he was not given a ballot because there was a cross 
after his name which we have indicated in the above 
sample. 
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This only tells half the story as a cross under the 
emblem of the Progressive Party would entirely elimin-
ate his right to that vote, and likewise a cross after the 
names of the three 2-year councilmen on the Progressive 
Party would entirely eliminate his right to such vote. 
Therefore, it is obvious this point does not state a cause 
of action. 
On propos,al number 2 the complaint says that the 
voter voted the emblem on the Progressive Party and 
then put a X for the plaintiff's name under the People's 
Party, and complains that this vote was not counted for 
him. 
The law governing the counting· of these ballots is 
set forth in 25-6-21 Laws of 1947, which reads as follows, 
insofar as material here: 
'' *. * * \ Vhen two or more officers are to he 
elected to the same office, the voter may.vote for 
the candidates for such office for whom he de-
sires to vote, provided, that if he marks more 
squares than the aggTegated nun1ber of names to 
be filled on such ticket, the vote shall be ~:ejected 
as to such officer. If a voter has placed a eros;-; 
in the circle at the head of the ballot and wishes 
to vote for a person on another ticket for an of-
fice for which nwre than one person is to br 
elect~d, he shall s6ratch through the names of the 
persons of the party under whose emblem he has 
marked a circle, for whom he does not wish to . 
vote.'' 
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Thus it will be seen that, coun:-;pl'~ propo~al No. 2 
does not state a cause of action because the plaintiff 
would not be entitled to such vote. A ballot :-;o voted under 
proposal number 2 vote~ for four councihnen when only 
three can be elected, and the law plainly says that the 
vote shall be counted for none of them. 
Proposal X urnber 3: This statement is ambiguous 
and uncertain. Apparently the plaintiff means to say: 
That the emblem is voted under the progressive ticket. 
Then the voter marks a cross for smneone of the three 
councilmen under the People'~ ticket. That means voting 
for four, and therefore none should count. There is no 
one scratched under the Progressive ticket. But he goes 
on to say: The judges then eliminated the vote for the 
person voted for under the People's ticket, and also the 
name opposite the name of such candidate as it appeared 
on the Progressive ticket. This means nothing. For in-
stance, turn back to the sample ballot above and place a 
cross after the name of Lawrence Peck under the People's 
party. Then his allegation would mean that the name 
of J. H. Harrison opposite the name of Lawrence Peck 
would likewise be eliminated. If this were true, it would 
not affect the vote for Lynn J ohnstun in any manner. 
Nnrely Proposal No. 3 does not state a cause of action. 
'rJ1en, again, under this point one, we direct the 
court"s attention to Assignment No. 8 under statement 
of error hereof, wherein it is clear that the plaintiff has 
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not complied with the clear mandatory provisions of 
25-14-4 UCA 1943, in failing to properly identify him-
self andto properly identify the defendant, and also fail-
ing to give us a clear statement of the matters com-
plained of. 
Points Nos. 2 to 7 inclusive, with reference to the 
Findings, Decree and evidence may be considered to-
gether. 
Suffice it to say that there was nothing in the plead-
ings to support the findings and nothing in the plead-
ings to support the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff 
and nothing in the pleadings which justified the court 
in making its order to open the ballots. In other words, 
we could admit the entire allegations of the complaint 
and there would be nothing to justify the court in open-
ing the ballot pouches. 
Poilnt 8 is incorporated under point 1 going to the 
necessary allegations of the complaint. 
Point 9: Here is presented the two exhibits which 
the court counted for the complainant. They were voted 
by check marks. Just two of them in the entire record and 
in the same district, and voted precicely alike except as 
to one candidate. Such voting could readily serve the 
purpose of identifying the two ballots, and furthermore 
the election judges may have had some specific informa-
tion that they were so identified. 
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It is true that under the new statute this eourt has 
held that a vote shall not be denied whPre a check mark 
is used in lieu of the cross, but it does not appear that 
the situation wa~ such as to give rise to the identification 
of ballots thus cast. 
Point 10: The court in this case allowed costs to the 
contestants. Of course, there are many instances in elec-
tion contests where costs should properly be allowed, but 
we cannot believe that our statute is all-controlling in 
cases of this character. The man whose right to office, 
and who has been inducted into office, is challenged, has 
no recourse as a citizen having been elected to public 
office but to defend the position to which he was elected. 
It was his duty to do so and while he did enter into the 
contest in defense of his office, he might have refused 
to answer or reply to the contest; the court nevertheless 
would have been required to sun1nwns the same witnesses 
and go to the same expense of trial which was pursued 
in this case, and yet the cost would fall upon the defend-
ant. This appears to u:;; to be materiall~r unfair, especial-
ly when no extraordinary cost \vas caused by the defend-
ant himself. He stood upon his rights and claimed the 
office, but did not call a witness. In any event we feel 
that the $64.80 costs charged against him are improper. 
Point 11. The election judges are set up by law to 
control the voting of the elector. These judges pFnnitted 
this vote with the stub attached, to be placed in the hal-
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lot box. It was clearly their own duty to see that the bal-
lot, after it was voted, was properly disposed of; that is 
to say, it was their duty to see that the stub was de-
tached before the ballot was dropped into the box. This 
is purely an error of the election judges and not of the 
voter. That is not all. When the ballots come out of the 
box for counting they should then have detached the 
stub and placed it where itbelonged and counted the bal-
lot for the defendant. This was denied to him. 
We come now to a general discussion of points from 
one to 7 inclusive and point out to the court wherein 
we insist that the pleading and evidence was insufficient 
to justify the opening of the ballots. Please refer to the 
stipulation set forth in Rec. 68 and 75. 
It will be observed that both court and counsel agree 
that there was not one ballot voted as alleged in the 
plaintiff's complaint. After the evidence was in, this mat-
ter was called to the attention of court and counsel, and 
virtually stipulated that there was no evidence support-
ing the complaint and no ballots cast as alleged in the 
complaint. 
The court took the position, however, that even 
though there was perjury in the execution of the com-
plaint and perjury in the evidence relating to the voting, 
that, nevertheless the court could do nothing about it; 
that our remedy was by criminal prosecution; that the 
matter of determining whether the ballot pouches shoultl 
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be opened \Ya~ re~ adjudicata even though the testimony 
upon that point wa~ perjured and P\·en thong·h the veri-
fication of the cmnplaint wa~ likewi~e a perjun~. 
'Ye believe that it i~ the rule that court~ do not set 
aside a verdict or decision on the ground of perjured 
testimony, except in specific cases in equity, but we do 
not believe that the trial court was justified in side-
stepping this issue when the perjury appeared, as shown 
by the stipulation, in the course of the trial. 
Let us look at the findings of the court upon this 
particular point: In its sumn1ary of findings, we find the 
following: 
'• The court at the conclusion of the evidence 
did determine and find that votes had prob,ably 
been counted for the contestee to which the con-
testee was not entitled, in sufficient number that 
it would change the result of the election." (Rec. 
p. !19) 
So we see that the trial court's idea was, that if there 
was pro1Jable cause to believe that the results might be 
changed, gave to the eourt the right to open the ballots. 
\Ve do not so understand the law. Before ballots can be 
opened there should be a prima facie ~howing, founded 
upon competent testimoney, under the pleading, that 
there would be sufficient change in the count, under the 
allegations of the complaint, to justify the opening of 
the ballots. A Decree cannot be entered upon a probable 
state of facts. 
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In this connection, let us quote from the exaggerated 
testimony offered by the plaintiff: 
Q. Mr. Harrison, now referring specifically to 
a ballot, if there were any, in which the Pro-
gressive emblem had been voted, and a cross 
placed opposite the name of Lynn J ohnstun 
under the People's ticket, describe how that 
was counted. 
A. As I said before, -
Q. · The nan1es are all on. the board there and you 
can see the relative position if you want to 
look. 
A. Yes, I know exactly. A number of times they 
would vote for Lynn J ohnstun, put a cross in 
front of Lynn J ohnstun 's name there, and 
unless there was- as I remember, they didn't 
count that at all unless there was a scratch 
through some name on the other ticket, unless 
there was a line drawn through. 
* * * •» 
Q. Now, how many ballots did you observe in 
which a cross was placed opposite the name of 
Lynn J ohnstun, and si1nilar to that which has 
been described to you, in which the ballot 
was not counted for Lynn Johnstun? 
* * * * 
A. I would say no less than thirty or forty bal-
lots.'' (Rec. 9-10) 
This testimony came from the chief witness of the 
contestant, and he readily testified that there were "30 
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or 40" ballots 1narked in the t>mhlent of the ProgTPssiYe 
ticket and also voting for .J ohnstun on the People's ticket, 
which ballots were counted for no one. (Rec. 7-8-9) 
Other testinwny of like character and extravagance 
was given. But no such ballots were found in the re-count, 
as shown by the stipulation. (Hec. 68 and 73) 
\Ve think the authorities are not in confli~t to the 
effect that, in an election contest, just the same as in all 
civil suits, the pleadings must be supported by .the evi-
dence; and finding supported by pleading. Citing author-
ities: Hamer r. Ho1cell, 31 Utah, 144,86 Pac. 1073: 
'' \Yhile the weight of authority holds that 
statutes governing contested elections should be 
liberally construed in order that justice may be 
done, we do not understand that this rule of liberal 
construction may be extended so as to overturn 
the well-established rule of practice that the ,evi-
dence m1.t-st be confilned to the issues raised by the 
pleadings, and that the judgment rendered must 
conform the11eto. And our attention has been called 
to no case which holds that in proceedings of this 
kind, or, for that matter, in any other class of 
civil actions, questions Ina~· be tried and deter-
mined which are pntirely outside of the issues. In 
the case of Boardman Y. (l riff in, :>2 Ind. 101, in 
the course of the opinion, the court sa~'s: 'The 
parties must recover upon the allegations of tl1e 
pleadings. The~· must reeover secun1dum allegata 
et probata or not at all. It must be so from the 
natnre of thing:-;, so long as our nwde of admin-
istering justice prevails. ·n would be folly to re-
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quire the plaintiff to state his cause of action anti 
the defendant to disclose his grounds of defense, 
if, on the trial, either or both might abandon such 
grounds and recover upon others which are sub-
stantially different from those alleged.' This case 
is cited with approval in Borders v. Williams, 153 
Ind. 36, 57 N.E. 527, where it is said: 'We per-
ceive no ground for the contention that in con-
tested election cases the procedure is more liberal 
than on the trial of other civil causes with re-
spect to the issues and evidence. The statute re-
quires the contestor to specifically state in hi~ 
complaint the grounds of contest relied upon.'' 
( l\1any cases cited.) 
''Counsel for appellant contend that the mat-
ters ·embraced in the challenges referred to come 
within and are covered h)· the first alleged ground 
of contest set forth in the complaint and desig-
nated as 'ground No. 1,' and which is set out in 
full in the foregoing statement of facts. By an 
examination of that paragraph of the complaint, 
it will be seen that it alleges a conclusion only, 
and contains no statement of fact. Now the same 
general rule of civil pleading which requires the 
plaintiff to set forth in his complaint the facts 
upon which he bases his right for relief governs 
in this class of cases. In fact subdivision 4, Sec. 
917, Rev. St. 1898, provides that the contestant 
shall set out in his petition' the particular grounds 
of contest,' and section 919 in effect provides that 
this shall be done, 'with such certainty as will 
advise the defendant of the particular proceeding 
or cause for which such election is contested.' In 
15 Cyc. 405, this same rule is announced as fol-
lows: 'In statutory proceedings to contest an eler-
tion the contestant's initial pleading, whethe1: it 
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he termed a declaration, eomplaint, petition, or 
notice and ~tate1nent, mu~t set forth the particular 
facts relied upon a~ invalidating the election of 
his opponent in order that the latter may be ap-
prised of the c.a~e he has to meet. Thus an allega-
tion that the contestant rereived nwre votes than 
the contestee i~ an avennent of a conclusion, * * * 
and when pleaded as an independent ground of 
contest will be regarded as surplusage.'' (Em-
phasis ours) 
The case of Hamer Y. Howell, supra, is cited with 
approval in the case of Frantz v. Hanson, 104 Utah 112, 
140 Pac. 2d 636. 
To show that the rules of pleading must be complied 
with, we find the following in this case of Frantz v. 
Hanson: 
'' vVe find that Frantz was really the one 
elected, but in the absence of a cross appeal our 
judgment can go only so far as to hold that Han-
son cannot prevail on his appeal, which leave the 
judgment as the lower court made it." (Frantz 
failed to file a cross-appeal, an essential of plead-
ing and procedure.) 
Bearing upon this question and also upon the sanctity 
of a certificate of election, the Colorado court, in the case 
of Quigley v. Ph.~lps, 132 Pac. 742, had thii-\ to say: 
"In conclusion, we say that if the Legislature 
had intended that the entire vote of an)' county, 
and for the same reason, of every count~· in the 
state, should he recounted upon mere demand (and 
that i~ what the appellants' contention amounts 
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to) ii would have been easy to so state. If it was 
intended that the certificate of election based upon 
the official count by the election officers should 
have no force as against an unsupported charge 
of fraud or incompetence on their part, and that 
official action shall no longer possess even a 
prima facie presumption of rectitude, then the 
legislature should have so stated. If such is to be 
declared the public policy of this state, then the 
functions of election officials will become an idle 
form .. Much time and expense would be saved by 
simply limiting their duties to a mere reception 
and sealing the ballots and delivering them to the 
courts for counting in the first instance. 
''We find no abuse of discretion in the re-
fusal of the trial court to recount the ballots, in 
the absence of any evidence of mal-conduct on 
the part of the election officials.'' 
We quote the following from the case of Evans l'. 
Rte·iser, 78 Utah 253, 2 Pac. 2d 615: 
"* * * Exhibit 414 has a part of the top torn 
off. We must assume that this ballot was not so 
torn when it was handed to the judges of election 
after the voter had marked his ballot. The judges 
of election are required to tear off the stub of the 
ballot after it has been marked and before it is 
placed in the ballot box. If the ballot was torn be-
fore it was handed to the judges of election, it is 
difficult to see how the stub could have been at-
tached. In the absence or proof to the contrary 
it must be assumed that the judges of election 
performed their duty, and if they performed their 
duty Exhibit 414 rnust have been torn after the 
ballot was marked by the voter. 
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'' * * * TlH' elector~ eannot be disfranchised 
h~· declaring their Yotp~ yoid for an act or iinis~ 
~ion of ~ome election officer, or smne one else, 
unless such ad or on1ission violates some express 
constitutional or statutory proYision, or amounts 
to intin1idation or fraud. 
"Under sueh ciretunstances, the respondent 
may not be heard to complain. The failure of the 
judges of election to draw six excessive ballots 
from the ballot box in district 54 may not be taken 
advantage of by the respondent where, as here, it 
appears that the failure of the judges of election 
to perform their duty in such respect did not and 
eould not change the result.'' 
1 1~urther quoting from 25-6-21, Laws of 1947: 
''No ballot furnished by the proper officer 
shall be rejected for any error in stamping or 
writing the indorsements thereon by the officials 
charged with such duties, nor because of any er-
ror on the part of the officer charged with such 
duty in delivering the wrong ballots at any poll-
ing place, but any ballot delivered by the proper 
official to any voter shall, if prroperly m(JJfked by 
the rater, b1e counted as cast for all c:andidaJtles for 
u:hom the voter, ha,d the riqht to vote, and for 
u'lwm he has t'ofed." (Emphasis ours) 
In conclusion let us say: 
First: The trial court, counted out the contestant 
two votes ahead of the contestee. If the ballot cast for 
the contestee, from which the stub was not detached, were 
g-iven to the contestee and the two ballots voted by check 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
mark, which the trial court gave to the contestant, were 
deducted from the trial court's figures, the contestee 
would have one vote in excess of the contestant. 
Second: We believe that the courts of this state are 
assuming a more strict attitude as time goes on with 
reference to the evidence required for a recount. Just to 
permit any one to come in with any kind of a false state-
ment, unsupported by evidence, and secure the recount 
of ballots, presents us with the greatest subterfuge and 
fraud in such matters thus far encountered. The door 
would certainly be wide open for the recounting of bal-
lots upon a mere supposition that a recount, regardles? 
of allegations of complaint, would change the results. \Ve 
insist such is not the law. 
Third: We respectfully submit that the certificate 
of election, duly issued to the contestee, cannot be im-
peached by the pleadings in this case, and certainly not 
on the stipulated evidence. 
We very respectfully submit that the decision of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully, 
GEORGE S. STEWART, 
Roosevelt, Utah 
PATTERSON AND BAYLES, 
203-5 Boston Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Atto•rneys for Defenda'llf 
and Appellant 
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